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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE NOTE IS NOT AN 
INTEGRATED AGREEMENT 
A. The Novell Case is Not Applicable to the Facts of the 
Present Case. 
Plaintiff relies on Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, 
Inc., 92 P.3d 768 (Utah App. 2004), for the proposition 
that the Note was integrated and therefore parole evidence 
was inadmissible. (Brief of Appellee, 18-25). Plaintiff's 
reliance is misplaced. The facts distinguish Novell from 
the present case. 
The defendant in Novell asserted that the written 
agreement was subject to a contemporaneous oral agreement 
modifying its terms. 92 P.3d at 771. The Utah Court of 
Appeals held, however, that no such agreement was made. Id. 
at 774. Instead, the evidence showed that during the 
negotiations over royalties, there had been draft agreements 
containing a formulation favorable to Canopy in deducting 
litigation fees and costs from royalties. Id. However, by 
mutual agreement of the parties, the term favorable to 
Canopy was removed from the final agreement. Id. 
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The removal of the litigation expense deduction by 
mutual agreement of the parties is conclusive. Because the 
parties came to a final and complete agreement not to deduct 
litigation expenses from royalties, the written agreement 
had become partially integrated as to that question and 
parol evidence of a different deal was properly excluded. 
The present case would be like Novell if Cantamar's 
agent, Thuett, and DSI's representatives had initially 
discussed whether the "Due Date" in the Note should be 
subject to a condition for obtaining a $15 million loan, had 
included that condition in a prior draft of the Note, and 
then in a final negotiating session had fully explored the 
issue and after considering it at length had agreed to 
remove it, leaving only the "Due Date." 
But that did not happen. The Note was a form 
generated by Thuett off his computer with no prior 
discussion of its terms. (Champagne Aff., 126, R. 66). 
Like its predecessors, the Note contained a "Due Date." 
(Id., Exh. 6; R. 92). But, as with its predecessors, 
there was no expectation that the due date would be enforced 
unless the $15 million loan were first procured from which 
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to repay the Note. (Id., 524; R. 65). Far from agreeing 
to remove the condition for a $15 million loan, the parties 
reaffirmed it at the final meeting, then signed the Note. 
(Id., 526; R. 66). 
The facts of this case require a different outcome than 
in Novell. They require the outcome reached by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 
1985). (See discussion of Union Bank in the Brief of 
Appellants, 34-35). 
In Union Bank, as in the present case, the trial court 
applied the parol evidence rule, refused to consider an oral 
agreement for a condition precedent, and granted summary 
judgment. 707 P.2d at 664-665. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the evidence of a condition precedent 
was admissible and was sufficient to rebut the presumption 
of integration. Id., at 666. 
B. DSI's Evidence Rebuts the Presumption of Integration. 
Cantamar argues that DSI has failed to present 
sufficient evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption 
of integration under the standard established in Novell. 
(Brief of Appellee, 23). Cantamar's argument, however, 
-3-
disregards the fact that Novell did not discuss or establish 
a standard for overcoming the presumption. There was no 
need to, because in Novell there was no oral agreement to 
challenge the presumption. Novell, supra, 92 P.3d at 774. 
The standard was, however, elucidated in Union Bank. 
There, the Utah Supreme Court held that evidence sufficient 
to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
integration was sufficient to rebut the presumption for 
purposes of summary judgment. Union Bank, supra, 707 P.2d 
665-666. 
C. Cantamar is Bound by Thuett's Course of Dealing. 
Course of dealing may be considered in deciding whether 
an agreement is integrated. Ele v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981). 
Cantamar does not take issue with the legal principle 
in Ele. Rather, Cantamar argues that "course of dealing" 
does not matter in the present case because the course of 
dealing on the prior notes was between DSI and "another 
party." (Brief of Appellee, 31). The "other party", of 
course, was Cantamar's agent, Troy Thuett. 
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Cantamar cannot so easily disown Mr. Thuett. Glenn 
Britt, the manager of Cantamar, admitted in his deposition 
that Troy Thuett's actions in meeting with DSI, preparing 
the Note, and obtaining DSI's signatures, were all done at 
the request of Cantamar. Britt Deposition, 47; R. 273. 
Mr. Britt also admitted that Thuett acted as 
Cantamar's agent in his course of dealing with DSI prior to 
the Note. At the second hearing on summary judgment in the 
court below, the following summary of Britt's testimony was 
provided by Cantamar's attorney: 
Mr. Britt's testimony in his deposition was that 
he, though the prior notes were funded by - or in 
the name of Mr. [Thuett's] company that Cantamar 
provided the funding for all of those notes 
through this broker. Cantamar is the one who 
provided the money for the notes either prior or 
at the time of this note. 
Tr., at 61 (emphasis added). 
Cantamar's admission was understood by the court below 
to mean that Thuett was Cantamar's agent. Judge Hansen 
stated his understanding as follows: 
[T]he defendants in this case claim that no money 
is due and owing and with respect to Paragraph 8, 
that was disputed on the theory that [Thuett] was 
an agent of the plaintiff and I think that's 
acknowledged by both sides that the money was paid 
for the prior notes by Cantamar and [Thuett] was 
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the agent that arranged for those loans payable to 
the defendants. 
Tr. , at 63-64 (emphasis added). 
For purposes of summary judgment, it must be concluded 
that Thuett was acting as Cantamar's agent, not only in 
obtaining the Note, but also in connection with the prior 
notes. 
Cantamar's relationship with Thuett is established not 
only by Cantamar's admissions, but by Cantamar's actions in 
pursuing collection of the Note. In Central Bank of Bingham 
v. Stephens, 199 P. 1018 (Utah 1921), the Utah Supreme 
Court faced a fact situation similar to the one in the 
present case: a bank's agent obtained a promissory note 
subject to an oral agreement that it would not be enforced. 
Id., at 1019. The bank's successor tried to enforce the 
note and wanted to disregard the agent's promises, but the 
Utah Supreme Court would not allow that: 
[The bank] could not in one breath be heard to say 
that Kelly is without authority to bind it as his 
agent and in the next breath insist that it, 
nevertheless, can avail itself of only so much of 
the transaction as was beneficial to it and 
repudiate all the rest. If it relies upon the 
note it must take it precisely as Kelly took it, 
namely, with the conditional agreement under which 
it was taken. It must either do that or not take 
*\jm 
it at all. The law is well settled that, in case 
a principal seeks to recover upon a contract in 
which the agent exceeded his authority, he must 
take the contract as a whole. ... An action to 
enforce notes taken by an assumed agent ratifies 
his act in taking them, and opens the door to a 
defense based upon his misrepresentations in 
obtaining them, or charges the principal with 
knowledge which the agent possessed concerning 
their consideration. 
Central Bank, supra, 199 P. at 1022 (emphasis added). 
By suing to recover on the Note, Cantamar ratified 
Thuett's actions and the representations by which he 
obtained the Note. In addition, Cantamar is charged with 
the knowledge Thuett had of DSI's reliance on his 
representations in signing the Note. The course of conduct 
between Thuett and DSI is an integral part of that knowledge 
and reliance and cannot be disavowed by Cantamar. 
II. 
THE NOTE WAS AMBIGUOUS 
A. Colonial Leasing Supports a Determination That the Note 
Was Ambiguous. 
Cantamar argues that the Colonial Leasing1 case does 
1
 Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Brothers 
Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
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not support DSI's position in this appeal. (Brief of 
Appellee, 25-27). Cantamar argues, first, that the holding 
in Colonial Leasing was based on provisions in the writing 
rather than the oral agreement; and second, that in contrast 
with the present case the oral agreement in Colonial Leasing 
was not inconsistent with the lease. (Id.) 
Cantamar's reading of Colonial Leasing is incomplete. 
The rule in Colonial Leasing was based on two equally 
important, independent grounds: (1) the terms of the lease 
suggested that it was really a sale; and (2) the oral 
purchase option also suggested that it was really a sale. 
731 P.2d at 485, 487. The language of Colonial Leasing 
suggests that the oral option, by itself, would have been 
sufficient grounds for reversal of summary judgment: 
"[A]ppellant has alleged an oral option ... and that is 
sufficient to create an issue of fact." Id., at 488. 
Near the end of the Colonial Leasing opinion, the 
Supreme Court cited with approval to the case of FMA 
Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), 
in which evidence of an oral option was admitted at trial 
over objection. Colonial Leasingf supra, 731 P.2d at 487-
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488. The Court likened Colonial Leasing to Pro-Printers in 
that in both cases evidence of an oral purchase option 
created an issue of fact as to the meaning of the contract 
and was admissible despite the parol evidence rule. Id. 
In its discussion of the Pro-Printers case, the Court 
in Colonial Leasing made the following observation: 
In any event, the agreement in this case, for an 
oral option, if any, is not inconsistent with the 
express terms of the agreement. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Cantamar seizes on this statement to distinguish 
Colonial Leasing from the present case. (Brief of Appellee, 
27). Cantamar argues that the condition precedent in the 
present case is "directly inconsistent" with the Note, 
making this case different from Colonial Leasing. (Id.) 
Cantamar's argument is not consistent with Utah case 
law. As will be shown in Argument III below, oral 
agreements which merely condition the effectiveness of 
written terms are not inconsistent with those terms. 
B. The Note Is Ambiguous Under the Doctrine of Practical 
Construction. 
In its opening brief, DSI argued that under the 
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doctrine of practical construction, the "Due Date" in the 
Note was ambiguous because none of the due dates in prior 
notes had been enforced. (Brief of Appellants, 23-24). 
In response, Cantamar argued the Due Date was 
significant, as shown by the fact that prior notes were 
rolled into new notes with new maturity dates. (Brief of 
Appellee, 17) . 
Both parties are drawing inferences from the facts. 
The difference is, that on a motion for summary judgment, 
only the inferences that favor DSI may be considered: 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must 
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. 
Frlsbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
1984) (emphasis added). 
For purposes of summary judgment, Cantamar's inference 
must be disregarded and DSI's inference must be accepted if 
fairly drawn from the evidence. The fairness of DSI's 
inference was shown in the Brief of Appellants, 23-27. 
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III. 
THE NOTE WAS MADE SUBJECT 
TO A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
In its opening brief, DSI relied on FMA Financial 
Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1980). In response, Cantamar makes two arguments in an 
attempt to weaken FMA. First, Cantamar argues that FMA only 
admits conditions precedent that are not inconsistent with 
the written agreement. (Brief of Appellee, 28). This 
argument fails, however, because parol evidence of a 
condition precedent to a payment obligation is not 
inconsistent with the payment obligation. This rule has 
been repeatedly recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. For 
example, in Central Bank, the Court stated: 
[I]f a written instrument is delivered upon an 
express condition, and is not to be effective 
until the condition is fulfilled, the condition 
upon which it was delivered ... may be shown by 
parol, and the effect of merely doing that is not 
to vary the terms of the written instrument. 
Central Bank of Bingham v. Stephens, 199 P. 1018, 1021 
(Utah 1921). 
The same rule was followed in Parker v. Weber County 
Irr. Dlst., 236 P. 1105 (Utah 1925): 
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[W]here a written instrument, regardless of its 
nature or conditions, is delivered upon the 
express agreement or understanding by the parties 
that the instrument shall not become effective 
except upon the happening of a certain event or 
not until some act or condition shall have been 
performed, the instrument does not become 
effective until the happening of the event or 
performance of the act or condition. Moreover, 
the conditional delivery may always be shown by 
parol. [cite omitted] Such evidence does not vary 
the terms of the contract, but it merely shows 
when the same became effective. 
Parker, supra, 236 P- at 1107 (emphasis added); accord, 
Nuttall v. Berntson, 30 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1934); Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. v. State Tax Commission, 73 P.2d 974, 977 
(Utah 1937) ; FhEL, supra, 617 P. 2d at 329, 
The only Utah case not in accord with the foregoing 
authorities is Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nlelson, 672 
P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983), cited by Cantamar in the Brief of 
Appellee at pages 28 and 29. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that Bushnell is outside the mainstream and that 
its ruling represents a "much stricter application of the 
parol evidence rule." SCM Land Company v. Watklns & Faber, 
732 P.2d 105, 108 n. 3 (Utah 1987). 
The strictness of the ruling in Bushnell may be 
explained by the fact that there was no evidence of any 
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discussion, let alone any agreement, between the parties. 
672 P.2d at 750. The evidence merely showed a "subjective 
and uncommunicated intent that payment be conditioned." Id. 
In contrast to Bushnell, in the present case the 
condition precedent was an express oral agreement based on 
repeated face to face communications between DSI and 
Cantamar. (R. 60-67). 
Cantamar's second argument against application of FMA 
is that FMA is limited to situations where the condition 
precedent prevents the "effectiveness" of the agreement. 
(Brief of Appellee, 29-30). Cantamar argues that DSI has 
admitted the "effectiveness" of the Note, and therefore that 
FMA does not apply to this case. (Id.) 
Cantamar bases its argument on certain selected facts 
culled from the record, such as that DSI has acknowledged a 
debt owed to Cantamar, that the debt accrues interest, that 
DSI has made some interest payments, and that DSI believed 
the Note would be rolled over when it came due. (Id., 29) . 
None of the facts listed by Cantamar constitutes an 
admission of the "effectiveness" of the Note for purposes of 
summary judgment. Any inference from those facts that might 
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be favorable to Cantamar must be disregarded. Frlsbee, 
supra, 676 P.2d at 389. 
IV. 
FAILURE OF THE CONDITION 
PRECEDENT DOES NOT TRIGGER 
DSI'S PAYMENT OBLIGATION WHERE 
FAILURE WAS NOT THE FAULT OF DSI 
Cantamar argues that more than a reasonable time has 
elapsed since failure of the condition precedent and 
therefore the obligation must be deemed immediately due and 
payable in full. (Brief of Appellee, 30-31). There are two 
defects in Cantamar's argument. 
A, Cantamar' s Argument is Not Supported by Utah Case Law. 
Cantamar cited no Utah case law in support of its 
argument and did not attempt to distinguish the following 
Utah law relied on by DSI: "Failure of a material condition 
precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform." 
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 
1217 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added). 
Cantamar did cite case law from other jurisdictions, 
but that case law can be distinguished, as shown below. 
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B. The Two Cases Cited By Cantamar Are Distinguishable. 
Cantamar cited two cases: Cheyenne Dodge, Inc. v. 
Reynolds and Reynolds Company, 613 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1980); 
and Sherman v. Inge!man, 138 P.2d 698 (Cal. App. 1943). 
(Brief of Appellee, 30-31). Both are distinguishable. 
In Cheyenne Dodge, the defendant did not even allege 
the existence of an oral agreement for a condition 
precedent. 613 P.2d at 1235-1236. Instead, the defendant 
argued that a condition precedent should have been implied 
from the wording of the written agreement. Id. This the 
court refused to do. Id., at 1236. 
In the present case, in contrast, DSI has submitted 
facts showing an express oral agreement for a condition 
precedent. (R. 60-67). 
The second case cited by Cantamar was the Sherman case. 
In that case, repayment of a promissory note for $11,000 was 
conditioned on the sale of a building owned by the obligor. 
138 P.2d at 700. The building, worth between $250,000 and 
$300,000, was subject to a mortgage of only $123,000. Id. 
Seven years had passed since the signing of the note. Id., 
at 699. The appeals court found that enough time had gone 
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by and the obligor had not made reasonable efforts to 
fulfill the condition or pay the note. Id., at 701. 
Under those facts, the Sherman court held that where 
the fulfillment of the condition is wholly within the power 
of the obligor, and the obligor makes insufficient effort to 
fulfill it, the court may impose a time limit and require 
diligence. 138 P.2d at 700. 
The present case is different from Sherman. DSI was 
powerless to fulfill the condition. Only Cantamar could do 
that. DSI should not be punished for Cantamar's failure to 
perform. 
California case law applies a different rule in 
situations where the failure of the condition is not the 
fault of the obligor. In Haines v. Bechdolt, 42 Cal.Rptr. 
53 (Cal. App. 1965), an architect entered into a written 
agreement to provide drawings for a motel addition. Jd., at 
54. Services were provided and partial payment made. Id., 
at 54-55. The architect sued for the balance due. Jd. The 
motel owners claimed there was a verbal agreement that no 
payment would be made unless financing was obtained, and no 
financing had been obtained. Id., at 54. 
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On appeal, the California Court of Appeals held as 
follows: (1) the verbal agreement was a condition precedent; 
(2) it was admissible because it did not vary the written 
terms but rather conditioned their effectiveness; and (3) 
for that reason, the written agreement never took effect. 
Id., at 55-56. The court further determined, however, that 
the motel owners had made a partial payment, which meant 
they intended to pay a reasonable amount for the architect's 
services. Based on that, the court remanded for 
determination of the reasonable amount of those services. 
Id., at 58. 
The reasoning and result of Haines should be applied in 
the present case. This case should be remanded for a 
determination as to whether there was a verbal agreement 
conditioning repayment of the Note on the obtaining of a $15 
million loan by Cantamar. If there was, the court below 
should determine whether the evidence indicates an intention 
to repay the loans obtained through Thuett on reasonable 
terms, and if so, what those terms should be. 
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"REASONABLE RELIANCE" IS 
A QUESTION OF FACT 
Cantamar argues that DSI's fraud defense must fail as a 
matter of law because DSI could not have reasonably relied 
on Thuett's promises. (Brief of Appellee, 33-37). Cantamar 
supports this argument in part by contending that cases 
favoring DSI do so because the misrepresentation goes to the 
"character" or "nature" of the document, whereas cases 
favoring Cantamar feature misrepresentations about the 
"contents" of the documents. (Brief of Appellee, 34-37). 
To the extent that this is true, the araument favors DSI. 
not Cantamar. 
The underlying question is, would reading the document 
correct the factual error? If so, then failure to read the 
document may be fatal. See, e.g., Johnson v. Allen, 158 
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah 1945); Kubey v. Wood, 373 P.2d 386, 
387-388 (Utah 1962); Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 
915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996). 
On the other hand, if the misrepresentation is not a 
direct contradiction of the writing, but instead is a 
promise not to enforce the written terms, or a promise to 
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enforce only on the happening of some condition, then 
reading the document would not correct the error. In those 
situations, the contents of the document are not decisive, 
especially on summary judgment. See, e.g., Union Bank, 
supra, 707 P.2d at 664; Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. 
Melbos, 607 P.2d 798, 800-801 (Utah 1980); W.W. and W.B. 
Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, the contents of the Note are not 
decisive. The oral agreement in the present case does not 
vary the terms of the written agreement, but instead sets up 
a condition to those terms becoming effective. For that 
reason, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the 
written terms themselves are so dispositive as to preclude 
reasonable reliance on the oral agreement. 
VI. 
MUTUAL MISTAKE IS A 
VIABLE DEFENSE IN THE 
PRESENT CASE 
Cantamar cites Warner v. Slrstlns, 838 P.2d 666, 670 
(Utah App. 1992) for the proposition that mutual mistake 
requires mistake as to the "actual contents" of a writing. 
(Brief of Appellee, 37). It is true that mistake as to the 
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actual contents is one of 3 alternative bases for mutual 
mistake that are identified in Warner, but it is not the 
exclusive basis. 
The full quote from Warner is as follows: 
The power to reform a written instrument for 
mutual mistake exists when any one of the 
following circumstances is satisfactorily proved: 
(1) the instrument as made failed to conform to 
what both parties intended; (2) the claiming party 
was mistaken as to its actual content and the 
other party, knowing of the mistake, kept silent; 
or (3) the claiming party was mistaken as to its 
actual content because of fraudulent affirmative 
behavior by the other party. 
Warner, supra, 838 P.2d at 670 (emphasis added). 
"Actual content" is only one of 3 alternatives. DSI 
relies primarily on one of the other alternatives, that "the 
instrument as made failed to conform to what both parties 
intended." Id. Based on the evidence presented by DSI, 
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
or not the Note as made failed to conform to what both 
parties intended. (R. 60-67). 
VII. 
FAILURE TO MAKE 
INTEREST PAYMENTS 
IS NOT DISPOSITIVE 
Cantamar argues that DSI's failure to make interest 
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payments triggers a default under the Note. (Brief of 
Appellee, 27). This argument ignores the effect of the oral 
agreement for a condition precedent to the payment 
obligations set forth in the Note. 
Cantamar also argues that DSI made some interest 
payments and then stopped, citing lack of funds. (Id.) 
This evidence is not conclusive. A reasonable inference 
from the facts is that DSI made some interest payments 
simply as an accommodation to Cantamar while waiting for 
Cantamar to obtain the promised loan and fulfill the agreed 
upon condition precedent. Whether making some interest 
payments would result in a waiver or estoppel is a question 
of fact which should not be resolved on summary judgment. 
VIII. 
DSI HAS NOT WAIVED 
ITS CLAIM THAT THE 
INTEREST RATES ARE 
UNENFORCEABLE 
Cantamar argues that by agreeing to roll over the 
amounts due on the prior notes into the Note, DSI waived any 
claim that the interest rate in the Note is unenforceable. 
(Brief of Appellee, 41-42). 
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Waiver should not generally be determined on appeal 
from a motion for summary judgment: 
Waiver is an intensely fact dependent question, 
requiring a trial court to determine whether a 
party has intentionally relinquished a known 
right, benefit, or advantage. 
IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 73 
P.3d 320, 323 (Utah 2003) (emphasis added). 
In a contract case, waiver requires proof of action 
inconsistent with contractual rights: 
Waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party 
to a contract intentionally acts in a manner 
inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as 
a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing party 
or parties to the contract. 
Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah 
App. 1995) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, DSI's willingness to roll over 
accrued interest from prior notes into the Note must be 
viewed in the context of the ongoing agreement conditioning 
repayment on obtaining a $15 million loan. As Carl 
Champagne testified in his deposition: 
Q. You agreed to those interest rates? 
A. Yes, on the proviso that we were going to get 
the investment to pay all this off. 
Deposition of Carl Champagne, July 13, 2004, at 53; R. 218) 
(emphasis added). 
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A reasonable inference from the foregoing testimony is 
that if the Note, or any portion of it, is to be repaid from 
DSI's income rather than from a large loan, then DSI did not 
agree to the high interest rates or the rollovers, and in 
such a case those rates and rollovers should be held to be 
unenforceable. 
IX. 
DSI'S ARGUMENTS AND 
EVIDENCE WERE PROPERLY 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
Cantamar contends that several of DSI's arguments, as 
well as DSI's Statement of the Case, should be stricken. 
(Brief of Appellee, 12, 14 n. 1). 
All of the facts in the Statement of the Case, and each 
of the arguments Cantamar seeks to have stricken, were 
presented to the court below in opposition to the first 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.) 
Cantamar's argument, unsupported by any legal 
authority, appears to be that because DSI did not re-file 
opposing memoranda and affidavits in response to the Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, they were not properly 
preserved for appeal. (Brief of Appellee, 12, 14 n. 1). 
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This argument disregards the facts and the law. The 
fact is that Cantamar, when filing its Renewed Motion, 
stated in the motion itself that it was based upon, Inter 
alia, the Affidavit of Carl Champagne and "the pleadings on 
file in this action." (R. 188-189). Having formally 
acknowledged and relied upon the affidavit and pleadings 
already filed by DSI, Cantamar cannot reasonably fault DSI 
for failing to re-file the same pleadings. 
The law, too, is more expansive than Cantamar in what 
should be considered by the appellate court on appeal from 
summary judgment. In Brookslde Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. 
Peebles, 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 2002), the Court held that an 
issue raised in connection with summary judgment did not 
have to be raised again in connection with a motion for 
reconsideration. The Court explained: 
[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such 
a way that the trial court has an opportunity to 
rule on that issue. ... TO]nee trial counsel has 
raised an issue before the trial court, and the 
trial court has considered the issue, the issue is 
preserved for appeal. 
Brookslde, supra, 48 P.3d at 972 (emphasis added). 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded 
for trial. 
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